Clinicians have sworn an oath to do the best for their patients: but what is best for a particular patient depends on what the clinician learns not only from that patient, but from what other clinicians and scientists have learnt from other patients. Medicine has always been a consulting profession, and today it has a too-extensive and ever-extending evidence base to be safely practiced without clinical guidelines. However, for there to be public as well as professional confidence in such guidelines, they need to reflect (especially within the finite resources of a publicly funded healthcare system) an ethically as well as scientifically defensible consensus, not only on what is best for those patients with whose treatment they are specifically concerned, but also on what is fair in terms of the opportunity cost to other patients and to society in general.
To achieve this ideal goal in a non-ideal world can be very difficult because neither clinicians nor economists can predict with certainty all the unintended effects of proposed treatments or policies evaluated at a population level, subject as they are to the idiosyncrasies of individual patients and the vagaries of politics. The best they may be able to do, in response to perceived unfairness to particular groups of patients (for example, by postcode lottery or of underfunding of research or treatment of specific conditions), is to devise and deploy summary outcome measures such as quality-adjusted life-years. These, in the interests of fairness, correct for a common psychological bias favouring known or present patients over unknown or future patients; and regarding all prospective patients as unidentified, they count each by a common measure [1] .
The problems with such measures have long been debated: quality-adjusted life-years have been criticized as ageist, for example [2] , while clinicians with patients whose unmet needs they consider to have been discounted may feel that the apparent objectivity of health economics is being used to justify judgements that are ultimately political [3] . Public and professional confidence in such judgements may be increased if to the principle of cost effectiveness are added two further principles, namely those of non-discrimination and of priority to the worst off in terms of lifetime health [1] : but also needed is evidence that the process by which such principles are identified and interpreted is both transparent and responsive to constructive criticism.
In principle, the concept of 'accountability for reasonableness' goes some way towards this: it requires that the reasons for particular resource-allocation decisions should be publicly accessible; they should also be based on defensible social and ethical principles, capable of revision if challenged and enforceable equitably [4] . If clinical guidelines are to include cost-effectiveness considerations therefore, they should be developed by a transparently consensual process, involving clinicians and patients affected by their recommendations both directly and as those who potentially bear the opportunity cost of those recommendations.
Organisations responsible for health technology assessments have developed procedures designed to meet the requirements of due process and stakeholder engagement in various ways in different countries. Procedures in the UK have been used as a model by many developed and developing countries [5] . In England, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) includes engagement with such stakeholders at every consultation stage of the appraisal process for specific new technologies. In addition, NICE has convened a formal citizens' council, which serves the purpose of consultation on the overarching principles that underpin reimbursement decisions. In Scotland, the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) has recently introduced a specific additional step in its appraisal process that involves explicit elicitation of public, patient and clinical opinion. This Patient and Clinician Engagement was introduced by the SMC early in 2015 and has featured in the recent assessment of several high-profile negative decisions, perhaps most notably in the treatment of advanced breast cancer.
Drugs such as pertuzumab, eribulin, trastuzumab-emtamzine and everolimus have all been determined non-cost effective by the SMC, including a review by the Patient and Clinician Engagement Committee. Clinicians in Scotland must now follow the resultant guidelines in the knowledge that they have been based on processes robust to judicial review by the Scottish courts. In England, the temporary availability of a specific cancer drugs fund (CDF), which was intended as a holding measure pending the implementation of value-based pricing, has avoided the need for similar decisions. With the CDF budget now exceeded, a process distinct to the NICE process has led to ''de-listing'' of several of these breast cancer drugs [6] . As a test of clinical and public confidence, it remains to be seen to what extent the appraisal process of the CDF is ratified within national clinical guidelines with the same confidence as those emerging from NICE and SMC decisions [7, 8] .
In general, provided that clinical guidelines have been developed by processes that are ethically 'accountable to reasonableness' and are also robust to judicial review, individual clinicians in principle should have no reason to complain that the interests of their own patients have been unfairly discounted, and if they feel that they have been, should be assured that they have accessible opportunities for attempting to rectify this. In practice, however, these clinicians are likely to be aware not only of guidelines that are constrained by the decisions of budget holders, either at the level of individual hospitals (e.g. a hospital formulary) or national disease-specific guidelines. They will also be aware of international guidelines, such as those by the European Society of Medical Oncology, which provide an ideal clinical guideline, assuming no budgetary constraint. These guidelines are freely available on the Internet and would be of great interest to an increasingly aware patient population, especially those denied treatments deemed non-cost effective by national or local guidelines.
While the local constrained guidelines give clinicians a decision-making framework within which to operate and which protects them from the legal responsibility of denying their patients optimal clinical treatment, the clinician still has a duty to provide each individual patient with the highest level of care. Provided the clinician believes that treating a particular patient according to the ideal international guidelines will do more good than harm for that patient, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the clinician qua clinician has a moral responsibility to advocate for them to be treated according to the ideal international guidelines. Discharging this moral responsibility is made no easier, however, because the clinician also has moral responsibilities as a citizen, and often as a manager of healthcare resources or even as a member of a guidelinedetermining body. These roles and responsibilities clearly involve giving equal consideration to the opportunity cost of whatever the clinician may advocate for the individual patient.
There is, we believe, no simple and straightforward way for the conscientious clinician to weigh these different moral responsibilities against one another: in practice, circumstances may determine to which greater weight is given. In all circumstances, clearly, clinicians have a responsibility, recently confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB [2015] [9] , to ensure that patient consent is fully informed: clinicians consequently are obliged to mention unfunded treatments if only because some patients may be able to choose to fund these themselves. Even where this is possible, of course, a fully informed patient in consultation with a clinician may decide that, for them, the probable burdens of the ideal international treatment outweigh its possible benefits. However, what if a fully informed patient in consultation with a clinician judges that the possible benefits outweigh the probable burdens of an unfunded treatment that they cannot fund themselves? In R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] [10], the UK Court of Appeal confirmed that clinicians, while having to be prepared to offer a second opinion, have no obligation to provide treatments that in their judgement will be of no clinical benefit to the patient: but here that is not necessarily the case and the clinician may judge that this particular patient has characteristics that may be predictive of a better response from the unfunded international ideal treatment than from the alternatives that are funded.
In these circumstances, it is open to the clinician to seek to persuade the healthcare provider to supply the preferred treatment through a request for that individual patient. This may, or more commonly may not, be successful, but it may also help to maintain the awareness of reasonable demand necessary to an ethically adequate process of fair resource allocation. If, subsequently, a pattern of cases in which an ideal international treatment begins to appear more effective for particular patients than do the funded alternatives, clinicians have the further option of discussing this with one another and reaching consensus statements which, through their professional bodies and clinical networks, can be fed into the national reimbursement authority stakeholder consultation and review processes.
These opportunities, of course, cannot remove the moral conflict that may be felt by a conscientious clinician who genuinely believes that to do the best for a particular patient would be to provide a treatment that, despite the best efforts of the clinician and his/her colleagues, is unlikely to be funded in time for this patient to benefit from it. What creates the moral conflict is that a conscientious clinician will also be aware of opportunity costs and of the need for fair and accountable ways of dealing with them. Conflicts of this type have been characterized as 'tragic choices'-choices which, because at any particular time they offer no morally satisfactory way of reconciling conflicting moral demands, must continue to be recognized as morally unsatisfactory, to maintain, and sometimes increase, the moral tension necessary to imagining and devising over time less unsatisfactory responses: as writers on this topic have remarked: 'a moral society must depend on moral conflict as the basis for determining morality' [11] .
